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Negotiating Climate Change in the UN:
Same Procedure as Every Year? Not Quite!
Camilla Bausch and Michael Mehling*
Heads of State of eight major industrialised nations
recently affirmed that the United Nations will re-
main ‘the appropriate forum for negotiating future
global action on climate change.’ Within the U.N.,
however, a number of concurrent ‘tracks’ have
emerged for negotiations and discussions, accom-
panied by a certain degree of overlap and giving
rise to questions on the mandate, scope, and limi-
tations of each track as a pathway to a future cli-
mate regime.1
These were the first two sentences of an article we
published in the inaugural issue of the Carbon & Cli-
mate Law Review in 2007. The first sentence referred
to an agreement by the Group of Eight (G8), at the
time under German Presidency, which had achieved
an implicit commitment of the United States – then
still ledbyPresidentBush– to thenegotiatingprocess
pursued within the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCC). This was a re-
markable achievement, as it settled a political fight
over the right forum, framework, and leadership in
the context of international climatenegotiations. The
second sentence provided a frame for the 2007 arti-
cle by referencing the difficulties – and thus implic-
itly the political disagreements – that were also
present within the UNFCCC process when it came to
finding a commonly acceptable forum and mandate
for negotiations on a future climate regime. Back in
mid-2007, no consensus had yet emerged on the suit-
able negotiation track, let alone on the substantive
mandate for negotiations.
A decade later, the first two sentences introducing
a similar article would probably read:
Heads of State and Government of 19 major na-
tions recently affirmed their commitment to the
ParisAgreement – isolating President Trump,who
has decided to withdraw the U.S. from the treaty.
The Paris Agreement still lacks a detailed ‘rule-
book’, however, and more importantly: Parties
need to show that they are implementing their Na-
tionally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to de-
liver on the common goal to keep global warming
at least well below 2 degrees Celsius.
What this shows is that things have changed funda-
mentally. The path to the present has not been easy,
and more akin to a rollercoaster: a high point was the
breakthrough at the end of 2007, when Parties passed
the so called ‘Bali Action Plan’2 with a mandate and
defined pathway towards a new agreement. But with-
in twoshortyears, thenegotiationsreacheda lowpoint
when theworldwitnessed their breakdown in Copen-
hagen3. For a few months, it even remained unclear
whether the UNFCCC process – and with it any hope
formeaningfulmultilateralismon the issue of climate
change – would ever recover. Yet it did, and remark-
ably quickly. Under the 2008Mexican Presidency and
the impressive leadership of the foreign minister of
Mexico at the time, Patricia Espinosa, who now heads
the UNFCCC Secretariat, parties agreed to reengage.
This new beginning culminated in a (preliminary)
happy ending: passage of the Paris Agreement in
2015.4Finally theworldhaditsmultilateralagreement.
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1 Camilla Bausch and Michael Mehling, ‘Tracking Down the
Future Climate Regime: An Assessment of Current Negotiations
under the U.N.’ (2007) 1(1) CCLR 4.
2 UNFCCC Dec 1/CP.13 (2007) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 3.
3 An unprecedented number of participants came together in
Copenhagen; more than 100 heads of state and government
attended. As the summit progressed, however, it became increas-
ingly clear that expectations going into Copenhagen had been too
high, and that parties had failed to reach agreement on too many
details. In the end, the Danish Presidency was unable to guide
parties successfully through this difficult situation, and instead
fueled the tensions with uncoordinated initiatives. Instead of
passing a landmark instrument for the future climate regime, the
meager result of the Copenhagen summit was a toned down
‘Copenhagen Accord’, which was only ‘taken note of’ by the
parties. See UNFCCC Dec 2/CP.15 (2009) UN Doc FC-
CC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 4.
4 UNFCCC Dec 1/CP.21 (2015) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1
2.
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Reasons for this success were manifold, including
the skilful French Presidency; the ever more dire
warnings of the scientific community; the voluntary
commitments and calls for action by a multitude of
players, including businesses, cities, civil society, and
the Pope;5 and the impressive pace of clean technol-
ogy innovation and cost reductions, particularly in
the area of renewable energy,6which has, in turn, led
to renewable energy investments outpacing those for
fossil fuels.7 More than any other factor, that latter
trend has made a transition to a climate-friendly
economy appear possible, affordable, and even
promisingwith respect to the business opportunities
it portends.
Beyond these factors, the success of the Paris cli-
mate summit can also be attributed to some of the
overriding features of the new agreement itself.8 For
one, the Paris Agreement allows parties to define
their desired level of climate ambition themselves in
their (Intended) Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions [(I)NDCs]. Furthermore, it embracesaverymod-
est notion of compliance. This party-driven approach
was a condition for its broad and nearly universal en-
dorsement. Bearing inmind theurgent need for swift
and ambitious action, however, the agreement also
includes some features to balance and strengthen the
regime over time:
1) The long term objective of keeping global warm-
ingwell below 2°C, with efforts to stay below 1.5°C,
including further qualifications (such as the com-
mitment to achievepeak emissions ‘as soon as pos-
sible’, and to arrive at net zero greenhouse gas
emissions during the second half of the century)
(Articles 2 and 4 of the Paris Agreement);
2) Engagement of all parties in climate action pur-
suant to an evolved understanding of ‘common
but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR). The
old Annex I/non-Annex I divide, which had been
a defining feature of the Kyoto Protocol, was final-
ly superseded. The Bali Action Plan had already
opened the door to broader engagement in 2007
with its concept of ‘nationally appropriate mitiga-
tion actions’ (NAMAs) for developing countries.
Now, Article 3 of the Paris Agreement defines the
general obligation that ‘all Parties are to undertake
and communicate ambitious efforts’ in order to
achieve the purpose of the agreement;
3) A global stocktake (Article 14 of the Paris Agree-
ment), which is to take place every five years. It is
designed to regularly assess the collective efforts
in relation to the aforementioned goal;
4) The progression of NDCs over time. Parties are
asked to update their intended efforts based on
the outcome of the global stocktake. According to
Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, the ‘efforts of all
Parties will represent a progression over time’,
with each new contribution beingmore ambitious
than the former one. Thus, an ambition mecha-
nism is established to help closing the so-called
ambition gap;9
5) Highlighting the importance also of action of non-
state actors.
5 Pope Francis published his Encyclical ‘Laudato Si’ at a strategical-
ly chosen point in time ahead of the 2015 Paris climate summit. It
was drafted with the support of several recognized scientists, and
highlighted the impacts of – and the need for action on – major
environmental challenges like climate change. See Pope Francis,
Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common Home (Encyclical, 2015)
<http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/
documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html>
accessed 16 August 2017.
6 There are many analyses of the trajectory of technology costs
which point in the same direction: a radical decline of prices for
renewable energy technologies, and a tendency of mainstream
forecasts (eg from the International Energy Agency) to underesti-
mate the growth in renewable energy capacities. As the Interna-
tional Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) has shown, for in-
stance, the levelised cost of electricity from utility-scale renew-
able energy sources such as onshore wind and hydroelectric
generation had already fallen below the cost range of fossil ther-
mal generation in many areas of the world and as early as 2014,
and newer or costlier renewable energy technologies such as
solar photovoltaics and offshore wind were also on a pathway
towards convergence with the cost of conventional thermal
technologies, see IRENA, Renewable Power Generation Costs in
2014 (IRENA, 2015) 27. But there are difficulties to overcome,
not least the challenge of low coal prices and an unfortunate
abundance of direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies, see for
example Ottmar Edenhofer, ‘King Coal and the Queen of Subsi-
dies’ (2015) 349 Science 1286.
7 This has highlighted a general and fast-paced trend which still
persists, as reflected in investment patterns. See, for instance,
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21),
Renewables 2017: Global Status Report (REN21, 2017) 116: ‘In
2016, renewable power technologies continued to attract far
more investment dollars than did fossil fuel or nuclear power
generating plants. An estimated USD 249.8 billion was commit-
ted to constructing new renewable power plants (including
$226.6 billion without large-scale hydropower, plus an estimated
$23.2 billion for hydropower projects larger than 50 MW). This
compares to approximately $113.8 billion committed to fossil
fuel-fired generating capacity and $30 billion for nuclear power
capacity. Overall, renewable energy accounted for about 63.5%
of the total amount committed to new power generating capacity
in 2016.’
8 For an overview of the agreement, see Ralph Bodle, Lena Donat
and Matthias Duwe, ‘The Paris Agreement: Analysis, Assessment
and Outlook’ (2016) 10(1) CCLR 5.
9 The ambition gap refers to the fact that, even if all NDCs are
implemented, more mitigation action will be needed to achieve
the committed temperature stabilisation.
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Parties have enthusiastically embraced the Paris
Agreement. It entered into force with unprecedent-
ed speed within a timeframe of roughly one year. To
contrast this with the other international agreement
elaboratedunder the auspices of theUNFCCC: it took
eightyears for theKyotoProtocol toenter into force.10
And maintaining the focus on the Kyoto Protocol:
while, in 2007, it still appeared to be one potentially
important pillar of a future regime, it has by now
been largely sidelined.
Based on this prevailing view at the time, the 2007
article elaborated on the negotiations conducted un-
der Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol regarding the
mandate to negotiate future commitment periods (of
which the first one ended in 2012). Although an
amendment to the Kyoto Protocol that introduced a
secondcommitmentperiodwaspassed in2012,11ma-
jor emitters such as the United States, Japan, Russia,
and Canada declared they would not ratify this
amendment.12 Although the first commitment peri-
od boasted a favourable record of full compliance,13
the lack of buy-in from thesemajor emitters rendered
the Kyoto Protocol little more than a hollow shell. Al-
readymarginalised, its relevance has been further di-
minishedwith the entry into force of the Paris Agree-
ment.
But as young as it is, the Paris Agreement has al-
so had to pass some early litmus tests. For instance,
theUShasannounced its intention towithdrawfrom
the treaty less than a year after its entry into force.
So far, the global community has stood by the Agree-
ment – and in fact the numbers of ratifications con-
tinued to increase – despite the defection of the
largest economy and largest historical emitter. In the
course of the G20 summit, which took place shortly
after President Trump’s withdrawal announcement,
the US ended up in an isolated position on climate
change, while the remaining nations – dubbed the
‘G19’ – not only confirmed their commitment to the
Paris Agreement, but passed the ‘G20 Hamburg Cli-
mate and Energy Action Plan for Growth’,14 which
is closely linked to the contents of the Paris Agree-
ment.
Looking back at 2007, it is a striking coincidence
that ten years later, the German Chancellor Angela
Merkel should once again have to negotiate with a
Republican US President averse to climate action.
Then as now, a key controversy centred around the
role of the international climate regime. In 2007,
Chancellor Merkel had to manage the controversy in
the G8 context, where leaders came to an agreement
in the end; in 2017, Germany presided over the larg-
er and more heterogeneous G20, and this time the
USdecided to adhere to its isolated position (as it had
already done during the G7 under the Italian Presi-
dency earlier in the year).
Despite its notification of withdrawal from the
Paris Agreement, the US will still have a voice in the
negotiations on implementation of the Paris Agree-
ment, and it will continue sitting at the negotiating
table for several years. This is due to Article 28 of the
Paris Agreement, which states that a party can with-
draw ‘[a]t any time after three years from the date on
which thisAgreement entered into force… [a]ny such
10 The legal thresholds for both treaties were similar. Art 21 of the
Paris Agreement states: ‘This Agreement shall enter into force on
the thirtieth day after the date on which at least 55 Parties to the
Convention accounting in total for at least an estimated 55 per-
cent of the total global greenhouse gas emissions have deposited
their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or acces-
sion.’ Similarly, Article 25 of the Kyoto Protocol reads: ‘This
Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date
on which not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporat-
ing Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for at
least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of
the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited their instruments
of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.’
11 UNFCCC Dec 1/CMP.8 ‘Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol’
(2012) UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1.
12 By August 2017, less than 100 parties had ratified the amend-
ment, lacking also many major emitters. An official overview of
the ratifications can be accessed here: <https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c
&chapter=27&clang=_en> accessed 16 August 2017.
13 Igor Shishlov, Romain Morel and Valentin Bellassen, ‘Compliance
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the First Commitment
Period’ (2016) 16(6) Climate Policy 768; it bears noting, however,
that Canada – which was set to miss its quantified emission
reduction commitment – withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol late
in the first commitment period, invoking the process set out in art
27.
14 The plan addresses a broad range of issues, including NDCs,
long-term low-carbon development strategies, energy sector
transition, energy efficiency, renewable energy expansion, access
to sustainable energy, climate resilience and adaptation, financial
flows, and inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. While lacking, for
example, timelines for measures such as the phase-out of ineffi-
cient fossil fuel subsidies, the plan can be considered a step
forward towards developing a more concrete roadmap and
towards integration of the traditionally separate climate and
energy topics, a key innovation of the 2017 German Presidency.
The US position was clarified in a footnote: ‘The United States is
currently in the process of reviewing many of its policies related
to climate change and continues to reserve its position on this
document and its contents’. G20, ‘Annex to G20 Leaders Decla-
ration: G20 Hamburg Climate and Energy Action Plan for
Growth’ (2017) <http://www.g20.org/Content/DE/_Anlagen/G7
_G20/2017-g20-climate-and-energy-en.pdf?__blob
=publicationFile&v> accessed 16 August 2017.
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withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year
from the date of … notification’. It remains to be seen
which political approach the US will take while still
a party to the Paris Agreement – an ‘empty seat’ ap-
proach, anobstructionist ordistractingapproach that
seeks to hamper efforts of others, or an engagement
approach, trying to shape decisions in a way that
would possibly open up political options to remain
in the treaty.
But as in 2007, the US is not the only difficult part-
ner for climate cooperation. The 2007 article dis-
cussed the Russian proposal, which was less driven
by substance as much as it was an angry reaction af-
ter a Russian negotiator felt he was not being heard.
Now, in 2017, Russia has signed, but not yet ratified
the Paris Agreement.15 It remains to be seen if and
how it will move forward with ratification, and how
it will behave during the negotiations.
Speaking of the negotiations:what is their current
status? With the Paris Agreement adopted and in
force, one might expect fewer challenges than we di-
agnosed in 2007, for instance regarding overlapping
tracks and confusing mandates. But much work re-
mains to be done. In Paris, parties decided on a com-
prehensive work program. The UNFCCC Secretariat
presented an overview of relevant topics and respec-
tive fora in March 2016,16 illustrating that the ‘big’
questions – especially those related to mitigation –
were referred to the ‘Ad Hoc Working Group on the
Paris Agreement’ (APA).
The APA was established by Decision 1/CP.21.
Working under the auspices of the UNFCCC, it was
designed to prepare for the entry into force of the
Paris Agreement. Like the Marrakesh Accords were
prepared for adoption at the first Meeting of the Par-
ties to the Kyoto Protocol, the APA has beenmandat-
ed with completing its work by the first ‘Conference
of the Parties serving as Meeting of the Parties to the
Paris Agreement’ (CMA). This mandate encompass-
es eg elaborating guidance on the features of the ND-
Cs (includingquestions of transparency and account-
ing), clarifications with respect to the global stock-
take (sources of input, modalities of the stocktake),
certain financing issues, and the rules for ‘effective
operation of the committee to facilitate implementa-
tion and promote compliance.’ Everything seemed to
be neatly organised.
And then an unexpected thing happened: the sur-
prisingly swift entry into force of the Paris Agree-
ment. Consequently, the CMA already convened for
the first time in 2016, less than a year after adoption
of the Paris Agreement. Unsurprisingly, the APA had
not yet finalised its draft decisions, resulting in re-
newedpotential for confusion. Establishedunder the
UNFCCC, the APA has the advantage that all parties
who have signed the Paris Agreement can actively
participate in the negotiations. Negotiations under
the CMA, by contrast, will only take place between
the parties who also have ratified the Paris Agree-
ment. In order to allow those UNFCCC parties that
will need more time for their ratification process to
still participate in the process of shaping the future
regime, the APAwork will continue –most likely un-
til the end of 2018. As a result, the APA will resume
its work at the 2017 climate summit (COP27) in
Bonn17, where the CMA will hold its ‘second part of
the first session.’
What, then, has changed since 2007?Whereas the
article published in 2007 highlighted key questions
for any future regime,18 the core questions at present
evolve around a new regimewith 154NDCs that have
alreadybeen submitted. This is a strongbasis towork
from. Going forward, all parties to the Paris Agree-
ment will have to submit NDCs, and subsequently
have to implement their NDCs, raise their ambition,
and render the Paris Agreement fully operational, so
that collectively theymay achieve the agreed temper-
ature stabilisation goal. While negotiations have re-
mained difficult a decade after our earlier article, the
Paris Agreementwith its NDCs provides a good start-
ing point for meaningful climate action, and directs
15 As of August 2017, 159 of the 197 parties to the UNFCCC have
already ratified the Paris Agreement. An official overview of
signatures and ratifications can be accessed here: <https://treaties
.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7
-d&chapter=27&clang=_en> accessed 16 August 2017.
16 UNFCCC, ‘Taking the Paris Agreement Forward: Tasks Arising
from Decision 1/CP.21’ (March 2016) <http://unfccc.int/files/
bodies/cop/application/pdf/overview_1cp21_tasks_.pdf> ac-
cessed on 16 August 2017.
17 The APA agenda can be found here: UNFCCC, ‘Agenda of the Ad
Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement at its First Session’
(2017) <http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_nov_2017/
application/pdf/apa_1-4_agenda.pdf> accessed on 16 August
2017.
18 At the time, our article highlighted the following questions: ‘any
future climate regime will have to define answers to the following
general questions: Who will participate? What kind of targets can
developed countries agree upon? What kind of commitments are
developing countries willing to take on? What kind of country
groups can and should be established, especially: should there be
new forms of differentiation within the group of developing
countries? How should questions relating to adaptation needs and
technology be answered? What types of incentive schemes and
sanctions can and should be institutionalised?’, see Bausch and
Mehling (n 1) 6.
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its parties in the right direction. During the same pe-
riod, the market prospects for abatement technolo-
gies such as renewable energy have dramatically im-
proved. In other words, there are good reasons to be
optimistic. Now it will be crucial to keep up the mo-
mentumexpressed in the ‘Paris spirit’: a spirit of com-
promise and commitment that may help parties
avoid getting lost in procedural issues. In this con-
text, the facilitative dialogue of 2018 will be an im-
portant opportunity to gauge the political situation.
